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TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY: THE BALANCING
ACT OF AMERICAN TRIAL COURTS AND
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS' NEW
APPROACH TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The broad scope of the discovery procedures in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) guarantees litigants before United States
federal courts access to more information than do the discovery procedures
of any other nation.' When parties to litigation pending in United States
courts have sought to utilize the expansive discovery methods of the Federal
Rules to discover evidence abroad, however, the litigants often have met
1. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement's Provisions on Foreign
Discovery, 16 N.Y.U.L. INT'L L. & POL. 1075, 1075 (1984) (United States procedural rules
permit litigants before United States courts to discover more information than do laws of any
other nation). Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)
provide procedures for litigants to obtain pretrial discovery of information and documents.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. The discovery methods of the Federal Rules include interrogatories, oral
and written depositions, procedures for inspecting or copying documents, procedures for
inspecting, copying or testing tangible "things" in custody or control of a party, and procedures
for inspecting land or other property of a party. Id. The scope of information obtainable
pursuant to the Federal Rules is liberal. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2007 (1970) (litigants have great freedom in discovery under Federal Rules)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. The Federal Rules do not limit the scope of discovery
merely to information that is admissible at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Rosenthal &
Yale-Loehr, supra, at 1075 (United States discovery rules do not limit discovery to information
that is relevant or admissible). A litigant may discover information that is inadmissible so long
as the information "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The broad scope of American discovery, by providing
parties an opportunity to obtain full knowledge of the issues and facts before trial, helps to
clarify and narrow issues for trial, avoid the possible miscarriage of justice that may result
from trials carried on without full disclosure of information and eliminate cases where the
outcome solely depends on fortuitous availability of evidence. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, at
§ 2001 (discussion of purposes behind broad scope of discovery under Federal Rules). Under
the Federal Rules, the parties conduct discovery without judicial assistance or intervention unless
a party affirmatively seeks the court's assistance to compel discovery or for protection from a
request, or unless a breach of peace occurs. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (court may, upon motion,
enter order to protect person from discovery request that is annoying, embarrassing, oppressive
or constitutes undue burden or expense); FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a) (court may, upon motion, enter
order compelling person to comply with discovery requests); Comment, The Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Coinmercial Matters: The Exclusive and
Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1464 (United States
courts are not involved in American discovery unless breach of peace occurs or party seeks
compulsion). A court will not subject a party to sanctions for failure to comply with another
party's discovery request, but the court may require the noncomplying party to pay the requesting
party's expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, should the requesting party subsequently
convince the court that the discovery request is valid and that the court therefore should issue
an order compelling compliance with the request. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (court granting
motion to compel compliance with discovery request may impose requesting party's expenses
on party whose conduct necessitated motion, unless court finds that opposition to request was
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resistance from the foreign nation.2 In fact, several nations have enacted
legislation that limits or forecloses the ability of litigants before foreign
justified or award of expenses would be unjust). A party that persists and refuses to comply
with a discovery request after a court has ordered the party to comply, however, risks sanctions
under Federal Rule 37(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (sanctions for failure to comply with judicial
discovery order). Under Rule 37, the sanctions a court may impose on a party who fails to
comply with a discovery order include a court order designating findings of fact adverse to the
noncomplying party, refusing to allow the noncomplying party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, striking out pleadings, rendering a default judgment, dismissing the action,
and finding the noncomplying party in contempt. Id.
2. See von Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective of the U.S. Private Practitioner,
16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L & POL. 985, 985-86 (1984) (broad United States discovery provisions are
primary reason for uncooperativeness abroad). Foreign hostility toward American discovery
proceedings results not only from the broad scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but also from foreign opposition to United States substantive law. Id. at 986 (foreign
disagreement with American substantive law is contributing factor to hostility of American
discovery abroad); see Comment, supra note 1, at 1464 n.8 (American attempts to enforce
substantive policies abroad have led to discovery conflicts between United States and foreign
nations); see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. I1. 1979)
(discussion of statutes prohibiting American discovery that three foreign nations enacted to
frustrate American enforcement of United States antitrust legislation). Moreover, the fact that
civil-law procedures for obtaining evidence differ significantly from United States discovery
procedures has caused additional hostility toward American discovery in civil-law countries. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 1464 (differences between civil-law discovery procedures and
common-law discovery procedures has created tension in transnational litigation). The primary
difference between United States and civil-law discovery is that discovery under the Federal
Rules is a private matter between the parties. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1464. United
States courts do not become involved in the discovery proceedings unless a party seeks the
court's assistance to compel discovery or for protection from a request. See supra note 1 (United
States courts are not involved in discovery proceedings unless party seeks order to compel
compliance with request or order to protect from request that is annoying, embarrassing,
oppressive or constitutes undue burden or expense). In civil-law countries, however, the court,
not the parties, gathers the evidence for trial. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter
Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 59-60 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (gathering of evidence is function of judiciary in
civil-law system); Comment, supra note 1, at 1464 (judges gather evidence for trial in civil-law
countries). The judge in the civil-law system decides which witnesses to interview and performs
the questioning. See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59 (judge interrogates witnesses in civil-
law discovery); Comment, supra note 1, at 1464 (civil-law judge decides which witnesses to
interview and what questions to ask in civil-law discovery). The civil-law system limits the
parties merely to suggesting questions. See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59 (civil-law
attorneys may suggest questions but civil-law discovery affords no opportunity for counsel to
question or cross-examine witnesses). After completing the questioning, the judge prepares a
nonverbatim summary of the evidence. See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59 (civil-law judge
prepares summary record of evidence after judge has completed questioning of witnesses). The
summary then becomes the official record of the discovery proceeding. See Philadelphia Gear,
100 F.R.D. at 59 (judicial summary of witness testimony is official record of discovery
proceeding); Comment, supra note 1, at 1464 (civil-law systems do not keep verbatim transcript
of testimony witnesses give during discovery). Since the gathering of evidence is a judicial
function in civil-law countries, civil-law countries often consider attempts by United States
parties and courts to gather evidence within their borders a violation of judicial sovereignty.
See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 60 (gathering of evidence in civil-law countries is judicial
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courts to discover information located within the nations' territory.3 These
statutes, known as "blocking statutes," prohibit disclosure of information
to foreign tribunals and often impose criminal penalties upon violators.
4
Nations enacting blocking statutes claim that such statutes are necessary to
protect national sovereignty.5 In contrast to the sovereign interest of foreign
nations, the United States has an interest in assuring that United States
courts afford every litigant adequate discovery so that the litigant may
present fully his claim or defense.6 The United States position is that broad
discovery encourages litigants and witnesses to completely and truthfully
disclose all relevant information involved in the litigation, thus facilitating
enforcement of policies encompassed in United States substantive law.
7
Neither the United States Supreme Court, the United States Congress nor
the Federal Rules has provided federal trial courts significant guidance in
accommodating the conflicting interests involved when litigants attempt to
function and therefore civil-law countries may consider discovery attempts by foreign courts or
foreign citizens a violation of judicial sovereignty).
3. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1080 (blocking legislation has constituted
primary response of foreign nations to unacceptable United States discovery methods). The
"blocking statutes" that most frequently arise in United States litigation are those enacted by
Australia, Canada, England, France and South Africa. See Batista, Confronting Foreign
"Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-resident Parties to American
Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61, 62 n.l (1983) (discussion of major foreign blocking statutes and
American judicial response to such statutes).
4. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 420 Reporter's Notes, at 20-22 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (blocking statutes prohibit disclosure
of information located in enacting state's territory and carry some form of penal sanction for
violations). There are two principle types of foreign blocking statutes, those that attempt to
force an American litigant to use the foreign state's discovery procedures or procedures of an
international treaty, and those that attempt to completely foreclose discovery of information
related to certain subject matters. Batista, supra note 3, at 63-64.
5. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1080 (nations adopting blocking
legislation view blocking statutes as necessary to protect domestic laws and policies).
6. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999
(10th Cir. 1977) (United States has interest in providing litigants before United States courts
adequate discovery).
7. Id.; 4 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & G. GROTHEER, JR., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
26.02[2] (2d ed. 1984) (United States liberal discovery rules encourage disclosure of truth). Since
the United States position is that liberal discovery promotes disclosure of the truth, United
States courts have emphasized that a foreign state often frustrates United States substantive
policies underlying a cause of action when the foreign state prevents a litigant before an
American court from obtaining information. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'I City Bank,
396 F.2d 897, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1968) (in ordering defendant to disclose information, court
emphasized great importance of United States policy interests underlying American antitrust
laws and found that permitting defendant to justify failure to disclose relevant information to
grand jury because of German blocking statute would frustrate important United States policies);
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512-13 (N.D. I1. 1984) (inadequate discovery in
private patent infringement actions frustrates important United States substantive interests
encompassed in United States patent laws).
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discover evidence abroad." As a result of this lack of guidance, United States
trial courts have struggled to formulate an acceptable method of resolving
discovery conflicts between the United States and foreign nations. 9
The leading authority concerning transnational discovery conflict is the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers'0 in which the Supreme Court addressed the critical issues that arise
when a party before a United States court objects to discovery on grounds
that a foreign blocking statute prohibits the party's compliance with discovery
requests." In Societe, the plaintiff' 2 failed to comply with a discovery order
issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
maintaining that to fully comply with the discovery order would subject the
plaintiff to criminal penalties under Swiss secrecy laws." The district court
found that the plaintiff's defense did not constitute an adequate excuse for
8. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note I, at 1081 (Congress, Supreme Court, federal
law enforcement agencies and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide little direction in
resolving transnational discovery conflict); Comment, supra note 1, at 1470-72 (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure fail to provide specific method to obtain evidence abroad).
9. Comment, supra note 1, at 1461 (American courts have struggled when faced with
problem of obtaining evidence abroad).
10. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
11. See Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S. Discovery: A Conflict of National
Policies, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1061, 1066-67 (1984) (Societe is sole Supreme Court
opinion addressing issue concerning what standards trial courts should apply to resolve conflict
between United States discovery and foreign blocking statutes). In Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, a Swiss company brought an action to recover assets the United States had seized
during World War II as enemy-owned property. Societe, 357 U.S. at 198-99. The United States
alleged that the Swiss plaintiff had conspired with a German firm to conceal ownership of
property located in the United States. Id. at 199. To establish its defense, the Government
sought a discovery order requiring the plaintiff to produce its bank records for inspection. Id.
at 199-200. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the United
States' request for a discovery order. Id. at 200. The Swiss plaintiff sought to avoid production
on grounds that disclosure of the bank records would violate Swiss secrecy laws and subject the
plaintiff to criminal penalties. Id. The district court found that the plaintiff's defense did not
constitute an adequate excuse for failing to comply with the court's discovery order and the
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Id. at 203. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the plaintiff's failure to comply did not justify such a
drastic sanction because the plaintiff had established that its failure to comply was a result of
conflicting foreign law and did not result from any bad faith or willfulness. Id. at 212. The
Swiss plaintiff established its good faith by the fact that even though the plaintiff had failed to
comply fully with the United States' discovery request, the plaintiff had attempted to secure
waivers and consent from the Swiss government and eventually did produce over 190,000
documents for inspection. Id. at 200.
12. See Societe, 357 U.S. at 199. In Societe, a Swiss company sued to recover assets the
United States had seized during World War II. Id. Since Societe was a post-deprivation action,
the Swiss plaintiff was in a position similar to a typical defendant. Societe, 357 U.S. at 210;
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 509 n.7 (N.D. I11. 1984). Therefore, courts
generally do not emphasize the fact that the party opposing discovery in Societe was the
plaintiff. Id.
13. Societe, 357 U.S. at 200.
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failing to comply with the court's discovery order, and consequently dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.14 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the district court's dismissal of the complaint was
unwarranted because the plaintiff had established that its failure to comply
was a result of conflicting foreign law and did not result from any bad faith
or willfullness.'
5
In resolving foreign discovery conflict, the Societe opinion provides only
limited assistance because the Supreme Court did not attempt to set out a
general test to be used in all cases involving foreign discovery conflict, but
instead attempted to limit Societe to the facts of the case. 6 A further
limitation on the usefulness of the Societe decision arises from the fact that
subsequent United States cases have focused on different aspects of the
Supreme Court's opinion, resulting in inconsistent interpretations. 7 Despite
the varied interpretations of its opinion, the Societe Court did not hold that
14. Id. at 203.
15. Id. at 212-13.
16. See Societe, 357 U.S. at 205-06; see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1147 (N.D. I1. 1979) (Societe Court explicitly limited ruling to facts of case before
court); Rosdeitcher, supra note 11, at 1069 (Societe Court confined its ruling to particular facts
of case before Court).
17. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 11, at 1067 (United States courts have interpreted Supreme
Court's opinion in Societe inconsistently). Some cases subsequent to Societe have focused on
the fact that the Societe Court refused to impose a drastic sanction on the party subject to the
Swiss blocking statute because the party had attempted in good faith to obtain a waiver from
the blocking statute. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FoREIoN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 420 Reporters' Notes, at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (United States cases
subsequent to Societe have focused on Supreme Court's unwillingness to impose drastic sanction
when Court determined requested information was subject to foreign blocking statute); see,
e.g., Seabrook v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Societe for proposition
that dismissal is not proper sanction when party is unable to comply); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (lth Cir. 1982) (stating that Societe Court merely held
that sanction of outright dismissal was inappropriate because plaintiff's failure to comply was
result of Swiss blocking statute and did not result from bad faith of plaintiff), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983). Some courts have stressed that under Societe, courts may require a party to
make a good faith effort to secure waiver of a foreign blocking statute. See RESTATEMENT §
420 Reporters' Notes, at 24 (United States cases subsequent to Societe have interpreted Societe
as authorizing courts to require party to make good faith effort to obtain exemption from
foreign blocking statute); see, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 525-26 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (warning foreign defendant that court, under authority of Societe, would impose most
severe sanctions if defendant failed to comply with court's discovery order unless defendant
attempted in good faith to comply with order despite applicability of French blocking statute);
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155,-_, 629 P.2d 231, 305 (1980)
(citing Societe for proposition that litigant is under duty to make every effort to secure relaxation
of foreign nondisclosure law). Other courts have focused on the Societe Court's suggestion that
courts may draw findings of fact adverse to the noncomplying party even if the noncomplying
party has acted in good faith. See RESTATEMENT § 420 Reporters' Notes, at 24 (United States
cases subsequent to Societe have followed Societe Court's suggestion that courts may draw
findings of fact adverse to noncomplying party even if noncomplying party has acted in good
faith). Still other courts have stressed the Societe Court's preference for a case by case approach
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a foreign blocking statute is an absolute bar to an order compelling compli-
ance with foreign discovery requests." However, Societe does stand for the
proposition that United States courts may not ignore foreign blocking
legislation. 19 Therefore, when faced with a foreign blocking statute, trial
courts must balance the conflicting interests, either at the order stage of
discovery to determine whether a discovery order should issue or at the
sanction stage of discovery to determine what sanctions are appropriate
should a party fail to comply with the order.20
Although the Supreme Court in Societe did not intend to establish a test
applicable in all blocking statute cases, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,2'
utilized the Societe opinion as a guide to create a universal three-factor
balancing test. 22 The Northern District of Illinois designed the Uranium
Antitrust test to provide guidance for trial courts at the discovery order stage
and the court's emphasis on trial court discretion in discovery matters. See id. (United States
cases subsequent to Societe have focused on Societe Court's emphasis on case by case approach
and on district court discretion); see, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (Societe requires United States courts to utilize
balancing approach on case by case basis); Wilson v. Stillman & Hoag, Inc., 121 Misc. 2d 374,
375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (Societe requires trial courts to use case by case balancing approach
to resolve foreign discovery conflict).
18. See Societe, 357 U.S. at 205-06 (district court was justified in issuing discovery order
even though requested information was subject to Swiss blocking statute); see, e.g., United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983) (foreign blocking
statutes do not bar automatically United States courts from compelling production of docu-
ments); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir.
1977) (Societe Court held that United States courts have power to order compliance with
discovery requests despite fact that complying with such order would subject complying party
to criminal sanctions in foreign state); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th
Cir. 1976) (Societe implies that existence of foreign blocking statute is not relevant to decision
whether discovery order should issue), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Pan American World Airways, 23 I.L.M. 748, 750 (D.D.C. 1984) (foreign blocking statute
is not absolute defense to discovery request); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 509
(N.D. III. 1984) (Supreme Court in Societe clearly indicated that foreign blocking statute does
not bar order compelling production of documents); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (foreign blocking statutes do not bar automatically United
States courts from issuing a foreign discovery order); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D. IIl. 1979) (foreign blocking statute does not prevent exercise of United
States court's power to order production of documents).
19. See Societe, 357 U.S. at 211-13 (district court should consider foreign blocking statutes
at sanctions stage); see also Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1145 (American courts should
not ignore fact that foreign blocking statute exists).
20. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text(foreign blocking statutes do not consti-
tute absolute bar to foreign discovery but trial courts may not ignore blocking statutes when
transnational discovery conflicts arise); infra note 23 (discussion of two stages of discovery
involved in transnational discovery conflict).
21. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
22. See id. at 1146-48 (Supreme Court opinion in Societe provides that decision whether
to order foreign discovery is discretionary and informed by three primary factors).
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of cases involving foreign blocking statutes. 2 The first factor of the Uranium
Antitrust test is the importance of the United States policies that underlie
the substantive basis of the plaintiff's claim. 24 The Uranium Antitrust court
stated that, generally, a United States court should grant a litigant's request
for an order to produce if to do so would effectuate strong Congressional
policies. 2 Under the Uranium Antitrust test, the policy interests of the
foreign state are not relevant. 26 The second factor of the Uranium Antitrust
test is the importance of the requested information in illuminating a key
issue in the involved claim.27 In measuring the second factor, the Uranium
Antitrust court stated that a court should not apply the normal relevance
standard of the Federal Rules. 21 Instead, the requested information must be
crucial in illuminating or resolving a key issue in the litigation before a court
may determine that the second factor of the Uranium Antitrust test weighs
in favor of the party requesting production.29 The third and final factor of
the Uranium Antitrust test is the degree of flexibility in the foreign nation's
enforcement of its nondisclosure laws.3 0 The more flexible a foreign country
is in applying its blocking statute, the greater the likelihood that a United
States trial court will issue an order compelling discovery under the Uranium
Antitrust test.3
Notwithstanding the three-factor balancing test of Uranium Antitrust,
several courts have adopted a balancing test found in section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
23. See id. at 1148, 1154-56. Controversies regarding foreign discovery conflicts occur at
two separate stages. RESTATEMENT (REvIsED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 420 comment f, at 17-18 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1982). In the first stage, a party seeks
judicial assistance to obtain evidence abroad and the court must decide whether to issue an
order to compel compliance with the movant's discovery requests. Id. The Uranium Antitrust
court stated that a trial court should apply the three factor Uranium Antitrust balancing test at
the order stage to determine whether the court should order foreign discovery despite the
existence of a blocking statute. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1146-48, 1154-56. The
second stage is the sanctions stage. RESTATEMENT, supra § 420 comment f, at 17-18. If the court
decides to issue a discovery order and the responding party fails to comply with the order, the
court must determine whether to impose sanctions for failure to comply. Id. The Uranium
Antitrust court also listed three factors that United States courts should consider exclusively at
the sanctions stage. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1147-48. The Uranium Antitrust
sanctions factors are whether the noncomplying party deliberately courted legal impediments in
a foreign country to evade discovery, the scope and applicability of the blocking statute and
the severity of penalties imposed for violation of the blocking statute. Id.
24. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
25. Id. at 1146.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1148.
28. Id. at 1146. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to discover
information that is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation or that reasonably will lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
29. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1146.
30. Id. at 1148.
31. Id. at 1146-47.
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(section 40)32 to resolve discovery conflicts involving foreign blocking stat-
utes. 33 Section 40 addresses international conflicts in general and does not
address specifically the conflict between discovery procedures and blocking
statutes. 34 The text of section 40 provides that when a jurisdictional conflict
develops between two nations, the nations should consider five factors to
determine whether to moderate the exercise of their enforcement jurisdic-
tion.3 When applying section 40 to resolve transnational discovery conflicts,
the section 40 factors are the national interests of both states, the hardship
of inconsistent enforcement on the person opposing discovery, the place of
performance, the nationality of the person opposing discovery and the extent
to which the foreign nation enforces the blocking legislation.
3 6
Although several courts have adopted the section 40 balancing test, the
section 40 test recently has come under substantial criticism.37 Commentators
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965) (list of factors nations should consider in moderating enforcement jurisdiction when
jurisdictional conflict between two nations arises) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT § 40].
33. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir.
1983) (court utilized § 40 balancing test to reverse district court's order compelling production);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384, 1389-91 (11th Cir. 1982) (court affirmed sanctions
for noncompliance with discovery order after concluding that United States interests outweighed
foreign interests under § 40 test), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). United States v. Vetco,
Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (court employed § 40 and Societe Court's good
faith standard to uphold sanctions for noncompliance with IRS summonses); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512-15 (N.D. I11. 1984) (court used § 40 and other balancing
tests to grant in part party's request to compel discovery of information held in France); SEC
v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court employed § 40
to grant SEC's request to compel discovery of information held by Swiss corporation even
though disclosure would subject corporation to criminal liability in Switzerland). At least three
courts expressly had adopted the § 40 test to resolve foreign discovery conflict prior to Uranium
Antitrust. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997-99 (10th Cir. 1977)
(court employed § 40 and Societe Court's good faith standard to vacate district court's contempt
sanction); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 407-10 (5th Cir.) (court employed § 40
to uphold grand jury subpoena served on nonresident alien even though nonresident alien's act
of testifying violated foreign law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902-05 (2d Cir. 1968) (court employed § 40 to affirm district
court's sanctions issued for failure to comply with grand jury subpoena ducus tecum even
though compliance would violate West German law). The Uranium Antitrust court, however,
expressly rejected the section 40 balancing test. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
34. See RESTATEMENT § 40 (factors nations should consider in moderating enforcement
jurisdiction when jurisdictional conflict between two nations arises); Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr,
supra note 1, at 1084 (§ 40 does not deal specifically with discovery conflicts).
35. See RESTATEMENT § 40. In foreign relations law, there are two types of jurisdiction,
prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at
1144. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power of a state under international law to enact a
rule of law. Id. Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the power of a state under international law
to enforce a rule of law. Id.
36. RESTATEMENT § 40.
37. See supra note 33 (listing several courts that have adopted § 40 balancing test); infra
notes 38-40 and accompanying text (criticism of § 40 balancing test).
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have argued that the factors of section 40 are too vague and open-ended"
and that courts easily can predetermine the outcome of the balance by finding
the United States interest paramount. 9 Commentators further have criticized
section 40 because the terms of section 40 do not require a balancing approach
but merely provide that a court should, in the exercise of the court's
discretion, consider the five section 40 factors when faced with an enforce-
ment jurisdiction conflict between the United States and a foreign nation. 40
To improve the section 40 balancing test as applied to discovery conflict
with foreign nations, the American Law Institute (ALI) reformulated the
section 40 test in section 420 of the Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (section 420).4 1 Unlike section 40, section
420 specifically addresses discovery conflicts between the United States and
foreign nations.42 Under section 420(1), a litigant before a United States
court that satisfies three major requirements may obtain information located
in a foreign nation. 43 First, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
section 420(1) requires a court order before a party may obtain transnational
discovery."1 By creating the court order requirement, the drafters of section
420 have attempted to decrease conflict with foreign interests by providing
for judicial supervision at the initial stage of discovery.45 Second, section
420(1) replaces the normal relevance standard of the Federal Rules with a
more stringent relevance standard.4 6 To discover information abroad, section
38. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1085 (§ 40 standards are indefinite and
open-ended).
39. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 11, at 1073 (American courts rarely give much weight to
foreign state's interests when performing § 40 balancing); Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of
U.S. Courts Regarding the Use of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Obtain Discovery in Transnational
Litigation: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1135, 1145-46
(1984) (§ 40 is invitation to chauvinism because court can preresolve outcome of test by finding
its nation's interest paramount).
40. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note I, at 1084 (§ 40's restraint merely is
discretionary and does not require balancing of conflicting interests).
41. See Note, supra note 39, at 1146 (ALI reformulated § 40 in §§ 419 and 420 of
Restatement (Revised) to correct inadequacies of § 40).
42. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 420 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (guide for United States courts when confronted with
transnational discovery conflict) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT § 420].
43. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (to obtain foreign discovery under § 420,
United States litigants first must obtain court order, which court will issue only if litigant
demonstrates that information is crucial and issuance of discovery order would be reasonable).
44. See RESTATEMENT § 420(l)(a) (United States court may order foreign discovery);
RESTATEMENT § 420 comment a, at 14 (§ 420(1) requires party to obtain court order before
seeking evidence abroad); cf. supra note 1 (discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
private matter between parties).
45. See RESTATEMENT § 420 Reporters' Notes, at 19-20 (purpose of court order requirement
is to advance balancing test to initial stage rather than compliance stage of discovery).
46. See RESTATEMENT § 420(a) (litigant may not obtain information held in foreign nation
unless information is "directly relevant, necessary, and material to action"); cf. supra note 1
(pursuant to rule 26(b)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure litigant is entitled to discover
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420 requires a United States litigant to demonstrate that the information
sought is "directly relevant, necessary and material." 47 The apparent intent
of the ALI in imposing the stringent relevance standard is to decrease foreign
resistance to United States discovery methods by eliminating what foreign
nations have labeled American fishing expeditions. 48 The "principle of
reasonableness" is the final requirement for the discovery of foreign evidence
under section 420. Section 420(1)(c) sets forth a five-factor balancing test to
assist courts in determining the reasonableness of a discovery request. 49 The
factors included in the section 420 balancing test are the importance of the
requested information, the specificity of the request, the origin of the
information, the extent to which the discovery request implicates the foreign
state's interests, and the possibility of securing the information through
alternative means.50 If upon balancing the five factors of section 420(l)(c) a
court determines that the discovery request is reasonable, the court should
enter an order compelling compliance with the request."s
If a court determines under section 420(1) that a foreign discovery order
should issue, section 420(2) provides guidance to the court in enforcing the
order when the nation in which the evidence is located has enacted blocking
legislation.12 When a foreign blocking statute prohibits a person to whom a
United States court has directed a discovery order from disclosing the
requested information, the court, under section 420(2)(a), may require that
person to make a good faith effort to secure from the foreign nation an
exemption to the blocking statute.5 3 Additionally, section 420(2)(b) states
that a court ordinarily may not subject a party who makes such a good faith
effort to the sanctions of default, dismissal or contempt.14 A court, however,
may make findings of fact adverse to a party who fails to comply with a
information that is relevant to subject matter of litigation or that reasonably will lead to
discovery of admissible evidence).
47. RESTATEmENT § 420(a).
48. See RESTATEMENT § 420 comment a, at 15 (foreign resistance to United States discovery
justifies strict relevance standard); von Mehren, supra note 2, at 985-86 (broad scope of United
States discovery that allows litigants to conduct fishing expeditions is primary reason for foreign
hostility).
49. See RESTATEMENT § 420(I)(c) (five-factor balancing test designed to assist courts in
determining reasonableness of foreign discovery requests). The United States position regarding
foreign discovery is that persons who transact business in the United States or otherwise bring
themselves within United States jurisdiction are subject to the burdens as well as the benefits
of United States law, including United States discovery law. RESTATEMENT § 420 Reporters'
Notes, at 19. The section 420 balancing test accepts the United States' position subject, however,
to the principle of reasonableness. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT § 420(l)(c).
51. Id.; see supra note 49 (foreign citizens who are within United States jurisdiction must
comply with United States discovery rules, subject to principle of reasonableness).
52. See RESTATEMENT § 420(2)(a)-(c) (guidelines for American trial courts in enforcing
foreign discovery order in face of foreign blocking statute).
53. RESTATEMENT § 420(2)(a).
54. RESTATEMENT § 420(2)(b).
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discovery order even if the party has made a good faith effort to secure an
exemption.ss
Evaluation of the above three balancing tests as tools to assist American
courts in resolving transnational discovery conflicts reveals that the section
420 test is superior to the section 40 and Uranium Antitrust tests. Section
420's requirement that a United States litigant must obtain a court order
before conducting discovery abroad is a valuable requirement.5 6 Threshold
review by a court assures that the foreign state's sovereignty interest will be
considered before any discovery takes place within the foreign state.57 More-
over, section 420's substitution of a stringent relevance standard for the
normal relevance standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
reduce foreign hostility toward United States discovery. 5 The primary foreign
criticism of United States discovery concerns the broad scope of information
that a litigant may secure under the permissive relevance standard of the
Federal Rules. s9 The section 420(l)(c) balancing test, however, would benefit
by incorporating three factors that are found in the section 40 and Uranium
Antitrust tests.60 First, unlike both the section 40 and Uranium Antitrust
test, the section 420 balancing test does not include as a factor the United
55. RESTATEMENT § 420(2)(c).
56. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1088 (§ 420's requirement that all
foreign discovery requests must be reviewed by court is valuable improvement in United States
procedural law); RESTATEMENT § 420 comment a, at 14 (§ 420(l) requires party to obtain court
order before seeking evidence abroad). Initially, discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a private matter between the parties. See supra note I (United States courts are
not involved in discovery proceedings unless party seeks order to compel compliance with
request or order to protect from request that is annoying, embarrassing, oppressive or constitutes
undue burden or expense). Unless a party affirmatively seeks judicial assistance to compel
discovery or for protection from a discovery request, the parties conduct discovery without
judicial assistance or intervention. Id. Section 420's court order requirement prevents parties
from taking evidence in a foreign nation without first seeking judicial approval. RESTATEMENT
§ 420 comment a, at 14 (§ 420 (1) requires party to obtain court order before seeking evidence
abroad). Since an interested private party might not consider the foreign state's sovereign
interests, section 420's court order requirement is necessary to assure that the foreign state's
interests are considered before litigants conduct any activity in the foreign state. See RESTATE-
MENT 420 Reporters' Notes, at 19-20 (purpose of court order requirement is to advance
consideration of various interests to initial stage rather than compliance stage of discovery).
57. See supra note 56 (§ 420's court order requirement assures consideration of foreign
state's sovereignty interests before parties conduct any activity within foreign state).
58. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1088-89 (§ 420's stringent relevance
standard is valuable improvement in United States procedural law); RESTATEMENT § 420(a)
(litigant may not obtain information held in foreign nation unless information is "directly
relevant, necessary, and material to action").
59. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 985-86 (broad scope of United States discovery that
allows litigants to conduct fishing expeditions is primary reason for foreign hostility).
60. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (ALI could improve § 420 balancing test
by incorporating United States' interest, extent to which conduct must take place within the
foreign state and foreign state's flexibility in applying its blocking statute as factors for court
to balance).
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States policy interest encompassed in the plaintiff's underlying substantive
claim. 6' To protect the sovereign interest of the United States, American
courts should consider the underlying United States policies that foim the
basis of the cause of action. 62 Second, when balancing the conflicting
interests, American courts should consider the extent to which conduct
necessitated under a discovery order must take place within the foreign state,
a factor found in section 40 but not in section 420.63 A court can reduce the
degree to which a discovery order conflicts with the sovereignty interest of a
foreign nation by prescribing forms of discovery that require the parties to
conduct little activity within the foreign state's borders.64 Finally, if a foreign
state has enacted blocking legislation, a United States court should consider
the foreign state's flexibility in applying its blocking statute, a factor found
in the Uranium Antitrust test.65 A foreign state that takes a flexible attitude
in enforcing its blocking statute is more likely to cooperate with discovery
within its borders than a foreign state that stringently enforces its blocking
legislation, especially when a United States court has balanced the conflicting
interests, including the foreign state's interests, and determined that a
discovery order should issue despite the existence of the blocking statute.
66
All of the foregoing balancing tests attempt to weigh the interests of the
United States against the interests of a foreign nation to determine whether
a United States court is justified in utilizing the discovery procedures of the
61. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1148 (first factor of Uranium Antitrust test
is United States interest underlying plaintiff's cause of action); RESTATEMENT § 40(a) (United
States courts should consider moderating enforcement jurisdiction when there is jurisdiction
conflict with another nation in light of interests of both nations); cf. RESTATEMENT § 420(l)(c)
(five-factor balancing test is designed to assist courts in determining reasonableness of foreign
discovery requests).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 (American courts should consider underlying
United States policies that form basis of cause of action when balancing interests under Uranium
Antitrust test).
63. See RESTATEMENT § 40(c) (United States courts should consider amount of activity
that must take place in foreign state when litigant seeks court order to compel discovery abroad);
cf. RESTATEMENT § 420(1)(c) (five-factor balancing test designed to assist courts in determining
reasonableness of foreign discovery requests).
64. See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 513 (N.D. Il. 1984) (to reduce
infringement on foreign state's sovereignty, district court drafted discovery order so that litigants
would conduct little activity in foreign state).
65. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1148 (United States courts should consider
degree of flexibility in foreign nation's enforcement of its blocking statute under Uranium
Antitrust balancing test); cf. RESTATEMENT § 420(l)(c) (five-factor balancing test designed to
assist courts in determining reasonableness of foreign discovery requests).
66. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (United States courts should be more
willing to issue discovery order if foreign state takes flexible attitude in enforcing its blocking
statute). A court should apply the modified eight-factor balancing test derived from section
420, section 40 and Uranium Antitrust at the order stage to determine whether the court should
order foreign discovery. See supra note 23 (foreign discovery controversies occur at both order
stage and sanctions stage of Federal Rules discovery proceedings).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain evidence in a foreign nation. 67
Since 1972, when the United States entered into force the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention or Convention),68 United States courts have had to contend with
the argument that the United States never may obtain foreign discovery by
means of the Federal Rules if the foreign nation is a signatory to the Hague
Convention. 69 Parties before United States courts have argued that the
Convention provides the exclusive means for one signatory nation to discover
evidence within the territory of another signatory nation. 70 The Hague
Convention is an international treaty designed to establish evidence-taking
procedures that are acceptable to the nation in which a litigant before a
foreign court takes evidence and at the same time are "utilizable" in the
forum nation.7' Twenty-five nations participated in the negotiation and
drafting of the treaty.7 2 To date, seventeen nations, including the United
States, have ratified the Hague Convention.
7 3
67. See supra notes 22-66 (discussion of balancing tests designed to assist United States
courts to determine whether to order compliance with party's Federal Rules discovery requests
when information sought is held in foreign nation).
68. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (supp. 1983)) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
69. See infra notes 87-118 and accompanying text (principal controversy concerning Hague
Convention in United States is whether Convention provides exclusive means to obtain evidence
in foreign signatory nation).
70. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1462 (litigants insisting that Hague Convention provides
exclusive means to obtain evidence abroad have presented new dimension to problem of
obtaining foreign evidence).
71. Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 785, 806 (1969) (drafters of Hague
Convention sought to establish transnational discovery procedures that would be tolerable to
nation where evidence is taken and utilizable in forum state).
72. Comment, supra note 1, at 1463. On April 17, 1970, the following nations signed the
Hague Convention: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Northern Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Republic,
the United States, and Yugoslavia. Hague Convention, supra note 68, 23 U.S.T. at 2576-77.
73. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY pt. 7, at 14 (1985). The following nations
have entered the Hague Convention into force: Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The
international treaty-making process generally involves four stages: negotiation, provisional
acceptance demonstrated by the affixing of signatures, ratification and entry into force. See G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 484 (4th ed. 1981) (treatise on public international law). As
with most international treaties, the Hague Convention does not become effective or binding
on signature alone. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at article 38 (Convention enters into
force for each signatory state when state ratifies and deposits instrument of ratification); see
also G. VON GLAtN, supra, at 487 (treaties rarely become effective and binding on signature
alone). The Hague Convention provides that the Convention enters into force for each signatory
state when the state ratifies the treaty and deposits a document with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands evincing such ratification. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at
articles 37-38.
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The Hague Convention provides two different methods to obtain evi-
dence located in a foreign nation.7 4 Chapter I establishes procedures for a
"letter of request," a request from a court in one nation to authorities in
another nation seeking foreign judicial assistance in taking discovery in the
second nation.7 5 Under a letter of request, the nation in which discovery of
evidence occurs, the state of execution, utilizes its own discovery procedures
to obtain information.7 6 The state of execution may not refuse to execute a
letter of request unless the state determines that execution would violate state
sovereignty or security, or that the request requires action not within the
province of the judiciary.77 Alternatively, Chapter II of the Hague Conven-
tion sets forth procedures whereby a litigant may obtain discovery in a
foreign state through diplomatic officers, consular personnel or a designated
commissioner.7 8 A foreign litigant may utilize Chapter II procedures only if
the litigant takes the evidence "without compulsion. ' 7 9 Chapter II proce-
74. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at chapters I-Il. The Hague Convention
establishes two different methods for obtaining evidence abroad, the letter of request procedure
and procedures for obtaining evidence through diplomatic officers, consular personnel or a
designated commissioner. Id. A court, however, reasonably may interpret the Hague Convention
as providing three different procedures for obtaining evidence because there are minor procedural
differences between obtaining evidence through a commissioner and obtaining evidence through
diplomatic or consular personnel. See id. at articles 15-17; see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Hague Convention provides three
methods to obtain evidence abroad); Comment, supra note 1, at 1466 (Hague Convention
establishes three basic methods to discover evidence in foreign nation).
75. Hague Convention, supra note 68, at Chapter I (provision establishes procedures
governing letter of request). To utilize the letter of request procedure, a litigant must apply to
the district court through motion for issuance of a letter of request. See Platto, Taking Evidence
Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United States-A Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575,
576-77 (1982) (application to court for issuance of letter of request is first step to obtain letter
of request under Hague Convention). The movant also should submit to the court an affidavit
stating the reasons why the court should issue the letter of request and a proposed letter of
request that complies with Convention requirements. Id. at 577. If the district court issues the
letter of request, the court, not the litigant, must send the request to the central authority of
the foreign state. Id. at 578; Hague Convention, supra note 68, at article 2 (each signatory shall
designate central authority to receive letters of request). The procedures of the foreign states in
processing and executing letters of request vary greatly. Platto, supra, at 578.
76. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at article 9 (state receiving letter of request
will apply own procedure when executing letters of request).
77. Id. at article 12 (state receiving letter of request may refuse to execute only if request
requires action not within functions of judiciary or receiving state determines that execution
would prejudice its sovereignty or security).
78. Id. at articles 15-17 (procedures for taking evidence through diplomatic agents,
consular personnel or designated commissioners).
79. Id. at articles 15-17 (litigants may take evidence pursuant to Chapter II of Hague
Convention only if litigants take such evidence without compulsion). Although litigants may
take evidence pursuant to Chapter II procedures only if the litigant takes such evidence without
compulsion, article 18 of the Convention provides that a state may make a declaration
establishing procedures whereby a diplomatic agent, consular officer or commissioner may apply
to the declaring state for assistance in compelling production of evidence. Id. at article 18.
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dures, therefore, are ineffective against recalcitrant witnesses. 0 Furthermore,
the state in which discovery of evidence is to occur may require a foreign
litigant to obtain prior permission before taking evidence pursuant to the
Chapter II procedures.8 ' Chapter III of the Hague Convention sets out
several provisions that apply to the Convention as a whole. 2 The important
Chapter III provisions include article 23 and article 33. Article 23 provides
that a signatory may refuse to execute letters of request that seek to obtain
pretrial discovery of documents.83 Article 23 is significant because a signatory
state may utilize an article 23 declaration to effectively block discovery of
nearly all documents. Under article 33 of the Convention, a signatory state
may modify or exclude use of the Convention's Chapter II procedures and
thereby remove the opportunity to obtain evidence through diplomatic
officers, consular personnel and designated commissioners.
s5
However, only Czechoslovakia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States have made
article 18 declarations. 7 MARTiNDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIREcToRY, pt. 7, at 14-21 (1985).
80. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1467 (Chapter II procedures of Hague Convention
generally will be ineffective unless witness is willing to testify); Radvan, The Hague Convention
on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning Its
Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031, 1051 (1984) (discovery
methods of Chapter II of Hague Convention are unsuitable when litigant anticipates significant
reluctance on part of witnesses to comply with requests).
81. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at Chapter II. Under article 15 of the Hague
Convention, a diplomatic or consular agent may take evidence from nationals of the nation
that he represents within the territory of another signatory state without first obtaining
permission from the state in which the evidence is located. Id. at article 15. Under article 16,
however, a diplomatic or consular agent may not take evidence from nationals of any nation
other than the nation he represents without first obtaining permission from the state in which
the evidence is located. Id. at article 16. Under article 17, a designated commissioner never may
take evidence without permission of the state in which the evidence is located. Id. at article 17.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, however, the Convention grants a signatory state the right
to make a declaration altering the permission requirements. Id. at articles 15-17. Therefore, a
signatory state may require diplomats or consular agents proceeding under article 15 to obtain
permission before taking evidence from nationals of the nation the diplomat or consular agent
represents. Id. at article 15. Furthermore, a signatory state may waive the permission require-
ments of articles 16 and 17. Id. at articles 16-17.
82. Id. at Chapter III (general provisions of Hague Convention).
83. Id. at article 23. Of the seventeen nations signatory to the Hague Convention, twelve
nations have made article 23 declarations preventing pretrial discovery of documents. 7 MAR-
TINDALE-HuBBELL LAw DmECTORY, pt. 7, at 14-21 (1985). Only Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslo-
vakia, Israel and the United States have made no article 23 declarations. Id. Seven other
signatory states, including Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, have made limited article 23 declarations. Comment, supra note 1,
at 1468 n.35. The limited article 23 declarations attempt only to prevent pretrial fishing
expeditions and do not bar requests for specific documents. Id. France, West Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and Portugal have made broad article 23 declarations that bar pretrial discovery
of all documents, regardless of the specificity of the request. Id.
84. See Batista, supra note 3, at 68 (Hague Convention provides no meaningful assistance
in obtaining pretrial disclosure of evidence in France because of French government's application
of French article 23 declaration).
85. See Hague Convention, supra note 68, at article 33 (nation may exclude application
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In the United States, the principal controversy concerning the Hague
Convention has been whether the Convention provides the exclusive means
to discover evidence situated in a signatory nation.86 Several litigants before
United States courts and at least one commentator have argued that the
Hague Convention provides the exclusive means to obtain evidence abroad.
87
American courts, however, have gone only as far as holding that the
Convention provides a mandatory initial procedure, leaving open the possi-
bility of later resort to standard discovery procedures should the information
obtained through Convention procedures prove inadequate.88 For example,
in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,8 9 Judge Ditter of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found that principles of international comity"° require a party seeking evi-
dence located in a signatory state to resort initially to the discovery procedures
of the Hague Convention, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the United
States intended the Convention merely to supplement the discovery proce-
dures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9' In another 1983 case
of Chapter II procedures at time of signature, ratification or accession); RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
OF nm FOREIN RELATIONS LAW OF Tm UNITED STATES § 483 comment b, at 44 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1984) (contracting states can opt out of Chapter II of Hague Convention) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT § 483].
86. See infra notes 87-118 and accompanying text (discussion of conflicting interpretation
on issue of whether Hague Convention provides exclusive means by which litigants before
American courts may obtain evidence in foreign signatory).
87. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 23 I.L.M. 748, 751
(D.D.C. 1984) (West German defendant argued that Hague Convention was exclusive means
for plaintiff to obtain evidence from defendant in West Germany); Lasky v. Continental
Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (West German defendant argued that
Hague Convention was sole means for plaintiff to obtain evidence in West Germany); see also
Comment, supra note 1, at 1475-85 (Hague Convention provides exclusive means to obtain
evidence in foreign signatory based on American constitutional doctrine and principles of treaty
interpretation).
88. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1470-75 (no American court has held that Hague
Convention provides exclusive means to obtain evidence abroad); cf. infra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text (discussion of American decisions finding Hague Convention provides
mandatory initial procedures for obtaining evidence abroad).
89. 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
90. See generally G. voN GL&iN, LAw AMONG NATIONS 27 (4th ed. 1981) (treatise on
public international law). International comity is the courtesy and respect between nations for
each other's laws and institutions. BLACK'S LAw DicnoNARY 242 (5th ed. 1979). A rule of
international comity, as opposed to customary or conventional law, does not represent a binding
or legal obligation. G. VoN GLAHN, supra, at 27.
91. Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 60-61. In Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American
Pfauter Corp., Philadelphia Gear Corporation purchased a gear grinding machine from a West
German manufacturer. Id. at 59. The machine subsequently caught fire and caused extensive
damage. Id. Philadelphia Gear Corporation brought an action against the West German
manufacturer, alleging defective design. Id. The plaintiff then served interrogatories and a
request to produce documents on the West German defendant. Id. The West German defendant
failed to comply with Philadelphia Gear's requests. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to compel
and the defendant defended on the ground that the Hague Convention provided the exclusive
means to obtain evidence in West Germany. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern
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interpreting the Hague Convention, Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Air-
lines, 92 Judge Kocoras of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois similarly held that the principles of international comity
required the plaintiff to proceed under the Convention to obtain evidence in
West Germany.9 3 The Schroeder court stated that the Hague convention
provides the obvious and preferable means to obtain evidence in West
Germany, but refused to rule that the Convention preempted all other
methods of obtaining evidence in a state signatory to the treaty. 94
Not all American courts have agreed that a party seeking to discover
evidence abroad must resort initially to the procedures of the Hague Con-
vention. 9" In Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.,96 a plaintiff served
interrogatories and a request to produce documents on the defendant, a West
German corporation. 97 The defendant sought a protective order, claiming
that the plaintiff should conduct all discovery pursuant to the procedures of
the Hague Convention. 8 In denying the defendant's protective order, Judge
Newcomer of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania emphasized the fact that the Hague Convention does not
provide that the Convention procedures are exclusive." The Lasky court
District of Pennsylvania denied the plaintiff's motion to compel, finding that principles of
international comity required Philadelphia Gear to resort initially to the procedures of the
Hague Convention. Id.
92. 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
93. Id. at 17,222-24, 17,224 n.l. In Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, a plaintiff
served interrogatories upon a defendant, a West German air carrier. Id. at 17,222. The defendant
moved for a protective order alleging that the Hague Convention provided the exclusive means
for United States litigants to obtain evidence in West Germany. Id. The Schroeder court granted
the defendant's protective order finding that principles of international comity required the
plaintiff to proceed initially under the Hague Convention. Id. at 17,222-24, 17,224 n.l.
94. Id. at 17,223, 17,224 n.l.
95. See also infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text (discussion of two United States
cases refusing to require litigant to resort initially to procedures of Hague Convention to
discover evidence in foreign signatory).
96. 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
97. Id. at 1228. The plaintiffs in Lasky v. Continental Products Corp. brought a product
liability action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against CGW, a West German tire manufacturer. Id. The plaintiffs sought damages from CGW
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that defective CGW
tires caused the accident. Id. After the plaintiffs served interrogatories and a request to produce
documents on CGW, CGW moved for a protective order arguing that it was not subject to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the plaintiff could obtain evidence only through the
procedures of the Hague Convention. Id. The Lasky court denied the defendant's motion for
a protective order,finding that the Hague Convention did not require the plaintiff to proceed
initially under the Convention's procedures. Id. at 1228-29.
98. Id. at 1228.
99. See id. (language of Hague Convention is not mandatory). In Lasky, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based its decision that the Hague
Convention was not exclusive, at least in part, on article 27 of the Convention. Id. Article 27
of the Convention, in pertinent part, states:
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found the language of the Hague Convention to be permissive, not manda-
tory, and concluded that the Convention did not supersede in any way the
discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'0° The Lasky
court, therefore, ordered the defendant to comply with the plaintiff's dis-
covery requests.'0 1
Consonant with the Lasky decision, Judge Getzendanner of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Graco Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 02 also rejected the first resort approach.10 3 In Graco, Graco,
Inc. filed a patent infringement suit against SKM, a French corporation.' °4
Shortly after filing the suit, Graco served interrogatories and requests to
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from-
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other
than those provided for in this Convention.
Hague Convention, supra note 68, at article 27. But see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text (drafters of Convention did not intend article 27 to preserve alternative methods of taking
evidence for signatory states seeking evidence).
100. 569 F. Supp. at 1228.
101. Id. at 1228-29.
102. 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I11. 1984).
103. Id. at 517-24. In Graco, Graco, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, filed a patent
infringement suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
SKM, a French corporation, and Kremlin Incorporated, an Illinois corporation wholly owned
by SKM. Id. at 507. Kremlin, Inc., was in the business of buying and reselling paint spraying
equipment. See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188, 189 (N.D. Ill. 1982). SKM,
Kremlin's parent corporation, manufactured a large percentage of the paint spraying equipment
that Kremlin purchased and resold. Id. Graco's complaint alleged that SKM and Kremlin
infringed upon a patent held by Graco on the manufacture and sale of hydraulic paint spraying
equipment. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 507, 527. Shortly after filing its complaint, Graco served
interrogatories and requests to produce pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
SKM and Kremlin. Id. at 507; supra note 1 (discussion of discovery methods available under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). SKM filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 507. The Northern District of Illinois, per Judge Getzendan-
ner, stayed discovery against SKM, pending its ruling on SKM's motion to dismiss. Id. Judge
Getzendanner denied SKM's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 23,
1982. See Graco, 558 F. Supp. 188, 193. Judge Getzendanner found that SKM's products
regularly entered the state of Illinois and that SKM received substantial revenue from the sale
of SKM products in the state. Id. at 192-93. The court concluded that SKM was "doing
business" in Illinois and, therefore, constructively had consented to being sued in the state of
Illinois. Id. at 192. Graco and SKM informally discussed Graco's discovery requests in the
months following Judge Getzendanner's denial of SKM's motion to dismiss, but SKM did not
file a formal response to those requests. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 507. On February 8, 1983, Graco
filed a motion to compel SKM to comply with Graco's discovery requests without objection.
Id. On April 4, 1983, the Graco court ordered SKM to file formal discovery responses,
effectively denying Graco's request that the court order SKM to comply without objection. Id.
at 507, 516. SKM filed a formal response on May 17, 1983, which consisted almost entirely of
objections, including an objection based on the allegation that compliance with Graco's discovery
requests would violate the Hague Convention because the Convention provided the exclusive
means for Graco to obtain information from SKM. Id. at 507.
104. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 507.
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produce on SKM, but SKM failed to respond. 05 Graco filed a motion to
compel SKM to comply with Graco's discovery requests. 1 6 In defense to
Graco's motion, SKM argued that compliance with Graco's discovery re-
quests would violate the Hague Convention because the Convention provided
the exclusive means for Graco to obtain information from SKM.1
0 7
In rejecting the defendants argument that the Hague Convention provides
the exclusive means for a United States court to obtain evidence in France,
the Graco court emphasized that judicial treatment of the Hague Conv6ntion
procedures as exclusive would change drastically the conduct of litigation
between nationals of different signatory states. 08 The Graco court stated
that requiring a party to process through foreign authorities a necessary and
routine aspect of a lawsuit, such as discovering information from an opposing
party, would greatly increase expenses and would amount to a major
regulation of the overall conduct of transnational litigation.' 9 Judge Getz-
endanner also stated that treatment of the Hague Convention procedures as
exclusive would interfere seriously with United States judicial sovereignty,
granting foreign authorities the final decision on what evidence American
courts may take from the foreign states' nationals even when those nationals
are within the jurisdiction of an American court."10 Noting that the text of
the Hague Convention does not explicitly prohibit alternative methods of
taking evidence, the Graco court surmised that the United States would not
enter into a treaty granting foreign states such great power over American
judicial proceedings without stating clearly the intention to do so."'
As further support for its finding that the Hague Convention did not
provide the sole means for the plaintiff to obtain information from SKM,
Judge Getzendanner emphasized the fact that SKM was a defendant in
Graco, not merely a witness, and that SKM could comply with Graco's
discovery requests without conducting an evidence-taking proceeding in
France." 2 The Graco court acknowledged that a court reasonably might
interpret the Hague Convention to provide the exclusive discovery procedures
for taking evidence within a signatory state's borders.' ' Nevertheless, the




108. 101 F.R.D. at 521.
109. Id. at 521-23.
110. Id. at 522.
111. Id. at 520, 522. The Graco court agreed with the Lasky court's interpretation of
article 27 of the Hague Convention, finding that article 27 appears to preserve alternative
methods of taking evidence. Id. at 520; see supra note 99 (discussion of Lasky court's
interpretation of article 27 of Hague Convention). But see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text (drafters of Convention did not intend article 27 to preserve alternative methods of taking
evidence for signatory states seeking evidence).
112. See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521.
113. See id. at 520.
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foreign parties from the discovery methods of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when discovery "proceedings" are not conducted within the
foreign state's territory." 4 The Graco court found that the location of the
evidence-taking proceeding constituted the dispositive factor, concluding that
foreign discovery procedures threaten a nation's judicial sovereignty only
when the procedures take place within the nation's borders." 5 In defining
the situs of discovery proceedings, the Graco court found that discovery
does not take place within a foreign state's borders merely because infor-
mation or documents to be produced in a United States court originally were
located in the foreign state.11 6 Judge Getzendanner further stated that a
United States court order compelling a resident of a foreign state to appear
for deposition outside the foreign state's borders similarly does not violate
the foreign state's judicial sovereignty, assuming the resident is subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States court.' '7 Consequently, the Graco court
refused to limit Graco to proceeding exclusively under the Hague Convention
because SKM could comply with Graco's discovery requests without con-
ducting any "proceedings" in France and thus SKM's compliance with
Graco's requests would not violate the treaty.""
In arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff did not need to utilize the
discovery procedures of the Hague Convention, the Graco court's analysis
involved an unnecessary metaphysical distinction. Although conceding that
a court reasonably might interpret the Hague Convention as providing
exclusive procedures for taking evidence within a signatory state's borders,
the Graco court adopted a very narrow and artificial definition of when
discovery takes place within a state's borders." 9 The Graco court's finding
that discovery takes place within a state's territory only when a litigant
conducts an actual evidence-taking proceeding within the state's borders is a
simple but unsatisfactory answer to the problem presented in Graco.
20
Notwithstanding the court's attempt to eliminate the charge that its discovery




118. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521, 524.
119. See id. at 521; supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (Graco court found that
discovery does not take place within foreign nation unless discovery proceeding is conducted
within foreign nation's borders). The Graco court found that discovery takes place within a
state's territory only when litigants actually conduct an evidence taking proceeding within the
state's borders. See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521. The Graco court found that the act of physically
producing documents or answers to interrogatories in the United States did not constitute
discovery in France merely because the necessary information initially was located in France.
Id. The Graco court, therefore, concluded that since the court was not ordering discovery within
French territory, the order did not infringe on French judicial sovereignty and Graco was not
required to proceed solely under the Hague Convention. Id. at 521-24.
120. But cf. infra note 147 (Graco court's reasoning concerning whether Hague Convention
procedures should be avenue of first resort was not correct, but court's decision to not require
Graco to utilize Convention procedures was correct decision).
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order infringed upon French judicial sovereignty by creating a metaphysical
distinction turning on where discovery takes place, the fact remains that an
American court is compelling a French resident to disclose information
located within the territory of France, thereby potentially interfering with
French judicial sovereignty.12 1 The Graco court's decision to not conduct an
evidence-taking proceeding in French territory undoubtedly reduced the
degree to which the court's order conflicted with French judicial sover-
eignty.'2 Contrary to what the Graco court stated, however, the court's
order did not avoid violation of French sovereignty.12  As the legislative
history of the French blocking statute demonstrates, France is concerned
with protecting information held by French residents as well as preventing
United States courts from conducting actual discovery procedures within
French territory. 24 The legislative history of the French blocking statute
makes clear that one of the primary purposes of the statute is to protect
information held by French corporations from abusive foreign pretrial
discovery procedures. 25 France clearly views a foreign court compelling a
French resident to disclose information held in France as an infringement on
French sovereignty, regardless of where the French resident is to produce the
information.2 6 Most, if not all, of the signatory states likely would not
accept Judge Getzendanner's view that a court can avoid violating a foreign
state's sovereignty by merely requiring a foreign resident to produce infor-
mation outside of the territorial limits of the foreign state.127 Consequently,
121. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (France has sovereign interest in
information held within French territory).
122. See RESTATEMENT § 40, supra note 32 (list of factors nations should consider in
moderating enforcement jurisdiction when jurisdictional conflict between two nations arises).
Under the section 40 balancing test, the extent to which activity must be conducted in the
foreign nation is a factor that United States courts must consider when deciding whether to
order discovery within the foreign nation, presumably because the more discovery activity an
American court conducts in a foreign nation the greater the infringement of the foreign nation's
sovereignty interests. Id. By not permitting Graco to conduct an evidence taking proceeding in
France, the Graco court reduced the amount of discovery activity conducted within French
territory and thereby reduced the degree to which the Graco court's order conflicted with French
judicial sovereignty. Id.
123. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (France has sovereign interest in
information held within French territory).
124. See Batista, supra note 3, at 66 (central purpose of French blocking statute is to
protect information held by French corporations).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Cf. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, Preamble (English blocking
statute). The preamble and legislative history of the English blocking statute demonstrate that
England is concerned with protecting information held by English residents and not just
concerned with preventing foreign states from conducting evidence taking proceedings within
England. Id. (preamble of English blocking statute states that purpose of statute is to protect
Britains from foreign compulsion requiring disclosure of information affecting trading and
other interests of England); Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAW.
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the Graco court should not have side-stepped the issue of whether the
plaintiff was required to utilize exclusively the procedures of the Hague
Convention by finding that the discovery order did not violate French
sovereignty and that the plaintiff therefore could use the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
128
In determining whether the Hague Convention provides the exclusive
means by which an American litigant may obtain evidence in a signatory
state, the text of the Convention provides a good starting point.' 29 As the
Graco court noted, the text of the Hague Convention does not provide
expressly that the Convention procedures are the exclusive means of obtaining
transnational discovery.3 0 The fact that the text of the Hague Convention
does not exclude alternative methods of taking evidence is undoubtedly the
primary reason no American court directly has held the Convention to be
the exclusive channel for obtaining evidence abroad.'3' However, the text of
the Hague Convention also does not state that the Convention procedures
are not exclusive. 32 The Graco court's finding that article 27 of the Conven-
tion preserves to signatory states alternative methods of seeking foreign
evidence is not the interpretation the drafters of the Convention intended.
33
The drafters of the Hague Convention merely intended article 27 to give a
signatory state the discretion to permit broader discovery within its own
borders if the state so desired. 34 In short, the text of the Hague Convention
does not provide that the Convention procedures are exclusive or that
alternative discovery methods are preserved. 35
Although the text of the Hague Convention provides no assistance in
determining whether the Convention's procedures are exclusive, the under-
213, 213 (1981) (legislative history of English blocking statute demonstrates that statute
constituted attempt to prevent United States courts from obtaining information necessary to
enforce United States antitrust laws against British citizens).
128. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (American courts do not avoid violation
of foreign state's sovereignty by merely requiring foreign resident to produce information
outside of foreign state's territorial limits).
129. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (discussion of whether text of Hague
Convention provides that Convention procedures are to be exclusive means for courts in one
signatory state to obtain information in another signatory state).
130. See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520 (text of Hague Convention does not prohibit expressly
alternative means of obtaining evidence); Hague Convention, supra note 68 (same).
131. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1470-75 (no American court has held that Hague
Convention provides exclusive means to obtain evidence abroad).
132. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 68 (text of Hague Convention does not
state that Convention's procedures are not exclusive).
133. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1475-78 (negotiating history of Hague Convention
demonstrates that drafters of Convention merely intended article 27 to give signatory states in
which foreign litigant takes evidence discretion to permit broader discovery than discovery
provided by Hague Convention).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 130-34 (text of Hague Convention does not state that Convention is
exclusive means to obtain foreign evidence or that Convention is non-exclusive).
1306 [Vol. 42:1285
TRANSNA TIONAL DISCO VERY
lying policies of the Convention provide valuable guidance. 3 6 The Hague
Convention aims to provide procedural uniformity in transnational discovery
and to reconcile the differences between the discovery methods of common-
law countries, such as the United States, and civil-law countries, such as
France. a7 In civil-law countries, the court, and not private attorneys, gather
the evidence necessary for trial. 38 Since discovery is a judicial function in
civil-law countries, these countries often view attempts by private parties to
secure information within their borders as a violation of the nation's judicial
sovereignty. a9 The policies of the Hague Convention and international
comity, therefore, support a requirement that a party first resort to the
procedures of the Hague Convention to obtain evidence in civil-law coun-
tries.14' However, a United States court should require a party to utilize the
Hague Convention procedures only if, taking into consideration from which
foreign state the party is seeking evidence, the Convention procedures will
be effective in providing the requesting party the information to which it is
entitled.' 4' Since some signatory states have made restrictive stipulations, the
effectiveness requirement will prevent needless expenditures of time and
money when a United States court can determine that an attempt to obtain
useful information through Hague Convention procedures in a particular
country would be futile.'42
136. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (purpose of Hague Convention is to
provide procedural uniformity in transnational discovery and bridge discovery differences
between common-law and civil-law nations).
137. See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59 (purpose of Hague Convention is to provide
procedural uniformity in transnational discovery and bridge discovery differences between
common-law and civil-law nations); Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State William P.
Rodgers to the President Regarding the Evidence Convention, S. Exac. Doc. A., AT V., 92d.
Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1, 1972) (purpose of Hague Convention is to set up system of taking
foreign evidence that bridges differences between common-law and civil-law discovery proce-
dures), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 324 (1973).
138. Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59-60; see supra note 2 (discussion of differences
between common-law and civil-law discovery).
139. Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 60; see supra note 2 (discussion of differences
between common-law and civil-law discovery).
140. Cf. supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text (discussion of two cases holding that
principles of international comity required plaintiff to initially resort to procedures of Hague
Convention).
141. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 1, at 1097 (Hague Convention procedures
should be means of first resort to obtain evidence in a foreign signatory unless Convention
procedures would be unavailing); RESTATEMENT § 483 comment i, at 47-48 (United States court
should not require litigant to resort initially to Hague Convention procedures if it is clear that
foreign state will not honor Convention request).
142. See Batista, supra note 3, at 69 (requiring litigant to utilize Hague Convention to
obtain evidence in France is requiring litigant to engage in futile quest); RESTATEmENT § 483
comment i, at 47-48 (United States courts should not require litigants to utilize Hague Convention
procedures if litigant is seeking documentary evidence and foreign state has made Article 23
declaration).
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In addition to the concern that added expense in time and money would
result if United States courts required plaintiffs to utilize Hague Convention
procedures exclusively to obtain information abroad, the potential infringe-
ment of United States sovereignty is another factor favoring a nonexclusive
approach toward the Hague Convention discovery procedures. 143 In Graco,
Judge Getzendanner stated that treating the Convention's procedures as
exclusive would permit foreign states to determine what evidence an American
court may take from foreign nationals even when the foreign national was a
party properly within the American court's jurisdiction. 44 The Graco court
correctly concluded that such a result would constitute a serious limitation
on the sovereign power of the United States and on the sovereign power of
American courts. 4 However, if United States courts require litigants to
utilize Hague Convention procedures only as a first resort and not as the
exclusive means to obtain discovery in a foreign state, the sovereignty of the
United States is preserved. A first resort requirement would preserve to
American courts the final decision on what evidence a foreign party before
American courts must disclose.'4 Requiring parties to resort to the procedures
of the Hague Convention in the first instance, when the court determines
that Convention procedures will be effective, permits the court to strike a
balance between the sovereign powers of the foreign country and the sover-
eign powers of the United States, while minimizing costs in time and
money. 14
143. See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521-22 (treating Hague Convention procedures as exclusive
would give foreign states final decision on what evidence United States court may take from
foreign state's nationals even when foreign national properly is within jurisdiction of United
States court, thereby raising possibility of serious interference with United States judicial
sovereignty).
144. Id. at 522.
145. Id. at 521-22.
146. See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 61 (court required litigant to utilize Hague
Convention procedures to obtain evidence in West Germany but expressly stated that court
reserved right to take further action should efforts under Convention prove futile).
147. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (first resort requirement balances
sovereignty interests of United States and foreign nation and effectiveness requirement prevents
needless expenditure of time and money). The Graco court's reasoning on the issue of whether
Hague Convention procedures should be the avenue of first resort was not correct. See supra
notes 119-34 and accompanying text (criticism of Northern District of Illinois' analysis in
Graco). A first resort-effectiveness analysis, however, supports the Graco court's decision to
not require the plaintiff in Graco to utilize the Convention procedures because Convention
procedures ultimately would not have been effective in Graco. France has made an article 23
reservation and utilized the reservation to virtually foreclose the letter of request procedure. See
Batista, supra note 3, at 68 (Hague Convention provides no meaningful assistance in obtaining
pretrial disclosure of evidence in France because of French government's application of French
article 23 declaration); supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussion of Hague Conven-
tion's letter of request procedure). France also has limited severely the effectiveness of the
Chapter II procedures. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussion of Hague
Convention's Chapter II procedures). To take evidence through diplomatic or consular officials
or an appointed commissioner in France, a litigant first must secure permission from the French
1308 [Vol. 42:1285
TRANSNA TIONAL DISCO VERY
United States courts are faced with a difficult task when a litigant seeks
to obtain evidence in a foreign nation. 48 A United States court order
compelling foreign discovery potentially may infringe upon the sovereign
interest of the foreign nation, while insufficient discovery may frustrate
United States policies underlying the plaintiffs cause of action. 49 The Hague
Convention attempts to establish evidence taking procedures that are accept-
able to the nation in which a litigant seeks to discover evidence and at the
same time "utilizable" in the forum nation.'50 Even though the terms of the
Hague Convention do not state expressly that the Convention provides the
exclusive means for one signatory to obtain information located in another
signatory, if the foreign nation is a signatory to the Convention, a United
States court, in the interest of international comity, should require the
requesting party to resort initially to the Hague procedures unless the court
determines that the Convention procedure would be ineffective in obtaining
the evidence to which the requesting party is entitled.''
If a United States court determines that Hague Convention procedures
would not be effective, or the court has required the requesting party to
utilize Convention procedures and the requesting party has been unable to
obtain the evidence to which he is entitled, or the foreign state is not a party
to the Convention, the United States court must weigh carefully the interests
of the United States and the foreign nation to determine whether the
requesting party may proceed pursuant to discovery procedures of the Federal
Rules.5 2 Section 420 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides
government and may take evidence only if that litigant takes evidence without compulsion. See
Hague Convention, supra note 68, at Chapter II, French declarations. Since SKM was a party
and subject to sanctions, SKM argued in Graco that it would be under compulsion and,
therefore, the plaintiff could not take evidence under Chapter II procedures. Graco, 101 F.R.D.
at 511. Considering French hostility toward United States discovery procedures, France likely
would have interpreted "compulsion" in the manner that SKM contended, thereby foreclosing
Chapter II procedures. See Batista, supra note 3, at 65 (France enacted blocking statute to
frustrate United States discovery because France perceives United States discovery as inherently
abusive). In light of the probable ineffectiveness of obtaining the information to which Graco
was entitled through the procedures of the Hague Convention, a first resort-effectiveness
analysis supports the Graco court's decision to not require the plaintiff in Graco to utilize the
Convention procedures.
148. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (United States and foreign nation's
sovereign interests are in conflict when litigant before United States court seeks to obtain
evidence in foreign nation).
149. Id.
150. Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 785, 806 (1969) (drafters of Hague
Convention sought to establish transnational discovery procedures that would be tolerable to
nation in which evidence is taken and utilizable in forum state).
151. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (first resort requirement balances
sovereignty interests of United States and foreign nation and effectiveness requirement prevents
needless expenditure of time and money).
152. See supra note 141 (United States courts should not require litigants to resort initially
to Hague Convention procedures if Convention procedures would be unavailing); Philadelphia
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United States courts significant guidance in balancing the competing inter-
ests.5 3 Section 420's court order requirement and stringent relevance standard
are both valuable requirements. 54 The five factor section 420 balancing test,
however, would benefit by incorporating three additional factors to form a
modified section 420 balancing test. 5s The factors of a modified section 420
balancing test would be:
1) the importance of the information sought to the investigation or
litigation in progress;
2) the specificity of the request;
3) the origin of the information;
4) the extent to which compliance with the request would undermine
important interest of the state where the information is located;
5) the possibility of alternative means of securing the information
requested;
6) the extent to which failure to comply with the request would under-
mine important United States interests;
7) the extent to which activity must take place within the territory of
the foreign state in order to comply with the request; and
8) the foreign states flexibility in applying the state's blocking statute.'",
If the procedures of the Hague Convention are not available for obtaining
evidence in a foreign nation, a United States court should utilize the modified
section 420 balancing test to determine whether, on balance, it would be
reasonable for the court to issue an order compelling compliance with a
litigant's Federal Rules discovery request.
JAMES R. LANCE
Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 61 (court required litigant to utilize Hague Convention procedures to
obtain evidence in West Germany but expressly stated that court reserved right to take further
action should efforts under Convention prove futile); see supra notes 22-55 and accompanying
text (discussion of three balancing tests derived from Societe Internationale v. Rogers that courts
have utilized in attempting to balance conflicting interests in transnational discovery).
153. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text (discussion and analysis of § 420).
154. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (§ 420's court order requirement and
strict relevance standard are valuable requirements).
155. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (courts should consider § 420 factors
and three additional factors when deciding whether to order foreign discovery under Federal
Rules).
156. See supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text (discussion and analysis of § 420
balancing test and suggestion that courts should incorporate three additional factors).
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